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BANKING BAILOUT IN MEXICO
The Mexican Banking System has experienced a significant
transformation over the course of time. The transformation can be
divided into three great stages:
First Stage: Private or Specialized Banking System (1897-
1982)
Second Stage: Nationalized Banking System (1982-1988)
and Public Bureaucratic Banking System
(1988-1990)
Third Stage: Re-privatized Banking System (1990-2000)
I. Stages of the Banking System in Mexico
A. First Stage
The first stage is characterized by the passage of legislation
aimed at organizing the control of the banking activity that provides
for the existence of mortgage, industrial and deposit banking. The
idea of credit extension by banks granting equipment-operating
credits also began during this stage. Also included in the first stage
are banks performing trust operations.
The operations carried out by the credit institutions are
organized through the creation of special departments intended to
avoid confusing operations. Two types of institutions emerged: (1)
credit institutions and (2) national credit institutions.
Furthermore, the recognition of the financial groups as
intermediaries between the Specialized Banking System and the
Multiple Banking System is prominent in the legislation of this
stage. The internationalization of the Mexican Banking System
occurred through the establishment of branch offices and agencies
abroad as well as the consolidation, incorporation and diversi-
fication of the operations and services from the Multiple Banking
System to the Mexican financial system.
Legislation passed during this time includes: General Law of
Credit Institutions and Banking Establishments (January 16, 1925);
General Law of Credit Institutions and Banking Establishments
(November 29, 1926); General Law of Credit Institutions (June 29,
1932); and General Law of Credit Institutions and Auxiliary
Organizations (May 31, 1941).
B. Second Stage
The second stage of the Mexican Banking System is
characterized by the establishment of the nationalized or public
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bureaucratic banking system, which had specific duties within its set
of attributions. This stage can be further divided as follows:
1. First Part: Nationalized Banking System (1982-1988). In
1982, a presidential decree nationalized Mexico's banking system.
The measure was designed to overcome the country's economic
crisis. The decree sought to consolidate and ensure an optimum
economic development for the nation. The decree did not include
the money or securities deposited by the clients, safety deposit
boxes, trusts or other real estate or personal property other than
the properties of the institutions and the properties of the
representatives of financial entities.
Prior to the 1982 decree, the 1941 Law of Credit Institutions
and Auxiliary Organizations regulated the Mexican banking
system. The Regulatory Law of the Public Banking and Credit
Service dated December 31, 1982 and the Regulatory Law of the
Public Banking and Credit Service dated January 14, 1985 repealed
the 1941 law. The main objectives of the 1941 Law of Credit
Institutions and Auxiliary Organizations were to set the guidelines
and characteristics of the credit institutions, their operation, and the
national development policies that could guarantee and protect the
interests of the public, promote savings and benefit the population
by providing access to a public service.
The national credit institutions had to be incorporated and
were then subject to the guidelines and policies laid down by Banco
de M6xico,' the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit,2 and the
National Banking and Insurance Commission (now, National
Banking and Securities Commission).' These institutions guided
credit institution operations according to regional programs and
1. "The Bank will perform the following functions: (I) Regulate the emission
and circulation of legal currency, exchange rates, intermediaries and financial
services and payment systems." Ley del Banco de Mexico ("L.B.M.") Art. 3, § (I).
2. "The Secretary of Finance and Public Credit is in charge of the following
affairs: ... (VII) Plan, coordinate, evaluate, and oversee the banking system, which
is made up of the National Bank for Development and other institutions in the
business of rendering banking and credit services." Ley Organica de la
Administracion Publica Federal ("L.O.A.P.F.") Art. 31, § (VII).
3. Article 2 of the Ley de la Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores states:
The Commission's primary objective will be to supervise and regulate, in
the scope of its competence, the financial entities, so as to procure their
stability and correct functioning, as well as to maintain and stimulate the
sound and equal development of the financial system as a whole,
protecting the public's interest. Also, it will be the commission's
objective to oversee and regulate natural persons and other juridical
persons, when they realize the activities foreseen in the laws relative to
the financial system.
Ley de la Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores ("L.C.N.B.V.") Art. 2.
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national development plans, in addition to coordinating the
programs of allocation of budgetary resources of the public treasury
and the credits of the institutions.
2. Second Part: Public Bureaucratic Banking System (1988-
1990). This era is characterized by the inefficiency of the federal
government in running the credit institutions. During this period,
the banking system was stagnant due to the lack of resources
needed to boost its operations. The system, therefore, grew weak
and was prevented from meeting its objectives. The success of the
plans for the development thereof and particularly for the
population appeared farther away than ever.
C. Third Stage
1. Re-privatized Banking System (1990). Through an
executive initiative, the 5th Paragraph of Article 28 of the
Constitution was repealed, subparagraph a) point 22 of Article 123
of the Constitution was amended in order to reestablish the mixed
regime of the provision of banking services because, under the
terms of the Third, Fourth and Fifth transitory articles of the Law
of Credit Institutions ("LIC"), the Regulatory Law of the Public
Banking and Credit Service ("LRSPBC") is still in force regarding
certain cases. The banking system needed to concentrate its actions
on fulfilling its objectives; namely, to meet social needs and raise
the population's standard of living; to expand and improve the
quality of banking and credit services and to avoid abuse, privileges,
and subsidies. Also introduced during this period was a limitation
stipulating that the public sector shall no longer intervene in the
banking system.
Two laws fundamental to the Mexican Financial System were
enacted on July 18, 1990: (1) the Law of Financial Groups and (2)
the Law of Credit Institutions. Finally, the re-privatization of the
banking system gave rise to the formation of financial groups and
shareholder ownership.
II. The Mexican Financial System
The Mexican financial system hinges on state financial
regulations that are set forth in Articles 25, 26 and 28 of the
Political Constitution of the United Mexican States.4 The articles
4. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Constitution] art.
25 provides in pertinent part:
The State will plan, conduct, coordinate and orient the national economic
activity, and will accomplish the regulation and fostering of the activities
2001]
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stipulate that the State is in charge of controlling national
development and strengthening the sovereignty of the country and
its democratic regime. This was done through planning,
coordination and orientation carried out to bolster the economic
activity of the country in which the public, private and social sectors
participate.
The Executive branch is entrusted with the responsibility of
financial control, which means that the credit or the capital flows
and the interest rates serve as a mechanism of control for the
proper maintenance of the economic balance of the country. To
exercise this power, the Executive is assisted by a federal public
administrative agency, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit.
The Ministry is empowered to project and coordinate development
planning; to plan, coordinate, evaluate and oversee Mexico's
banking system; and to exercise authority in matters of insurance,
bonds, securities, credit organizations, and auxiliary credit
activities.'
which are demanded by the public interest, within the scope of liberty
given by this Constitution.... The public sector, the private sector and
the social sector will concur, acting in a socially responsible manner, in
the development of the national economy; without damaging other forms
of economical activity that would contribute to the development of the
Nation.
Id. at Art. 25. Article 26 of the Mexican Constitution states:
The State will organize a democratic system of planning to promote the
national development, which will characterize the economic growth as
solid, dynamic, permanent and equitable; so as to achieve independence,
and political, social and cultural democratization....
Id. at art. 26. Finally, Art. 28 of the Constitution provides:
In the United States of Mexico, monopolies, monopolistic practices, tax
exemptions according to the terms and conditions stated by the laws are
prohibited. The same treatment will be given to prohibitions given to
protect certain industries. ... The laws will state the basis to determine
the ceiling for prices of articles, materials or products that are considered
necessary for the national economy or popular consumption, as well as
impose modalities for the distribution of those articles, materials or
products, so to avoid that unnecessary or excessive intermediation cause
insufficiency to the supply as well as a raise in prices. The law will protect
the consumers and foster their organization so to take the best care of
their interests.... The State will have a central bank that will be
autonomous when exercising its functions and administration. Its
primary objective will be to procure the stability of the legal currency
purchasing power, strengthening the national development, which
corresponds to the State.
Id. at art. 28.
5. See L.O.A.P.F., supra note 2.
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Two broad fields can be distinguished in the Mexican financial
system: the field of authorities and the field of institutions. These
two fields constitute the Mexican banking system.
A. Authorities of the Mexican Banking System
The authorities in charge of the Mexican financial system are
the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit ("SHCP"), the National
Banking and Securities Commission ("CNBV"), the Banco de
M6xico ("BM"), the National Commission for the Defense of Users
of Financial Services ("CONDUSEF"), and the Banking Savings
Protection Institute ("IPAB").
1. The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. The Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit belongs to the Public Centralized
Administration.6 Its competence is determined under Article 31 of
the Organic Law of the Public Federal Administration.7 In banking
matters, it is empowered to project and coordinate national
development planning, to prepare the National Development Plan
with the cooperation of the interested social groups, to plan,
coordinate, evaluate and oversee Mexico's banking system that
encompasses the National Development Banking System and other
institutions in charge of providing banking and credit service, to
exercise authority in matters of insurance,8 bonds,9 securities,"
6. L.O.A.P.F. Art. 26 provides:
To accomplish the administrative affairs, the Executive Branch will have
the following secretaries: Secretary of Government, Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Secretary of National Defense, Secretary of Admiralty, Secretary
of Public Security, Secretary of Finance and Public Credit, Secretary of
Social Development, Secretary of the Environment and Natural
Resources, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Economy, Secretary of
Agriculture, Rural Development, Fishing and Feeding, Secretary of
Communication and Transport, Secretary of Administrative
Development, Secretary of Public Education, Secretary of Health,
Secretary of Employment and Social Forecast, Secretary of Agricultural
Reform, Secretary of Tourism, Legal Advice for the Federal Executive.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. See L.O.A.P.F., supra note 2.
8. Article 2 of the Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualistas de
Seguros provides:
The Secretary of Finance and Public Credit will be the competent entity
to interpret, apply and resolve for administrative effects any matter
related with the precepts of this law and in general for any matter that
refers to the institutions and insurance companies.... It will be the
referred Secretary's exclusive competence to adopt any measures relative
to the creation and functioning of national insurance companies.
Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualistas de Seguros
("L.G.I.S.M.S.") Art. 2.
9. Article 1 of the Ley Federal de Instituciones de Fianzas provides in
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credit organizations, and auxiliary credit activities," and to construe
the precepts of the Law of Credit Institutions for administrative
12
purposes.
With respect to the multiple banking institutions, the Ministry
of Finance and Public Credit must authorize, through the approval
of the deed of incorporation, the credit institutions to carry out the
provision of their institutional services 3 and to issue guidelines to
be followed by the latter when the federal government holds
control due to its shareholding in matters of preparation and
approval of their annual budgets, as well as with respect to the
administration of salaries, benefits and other matters subject to
pertinent part:
... It will be the exclusive competence of the Secretary of Finance and
Public Credit to adopt all measures relative to the creation and
functioning of the national bond institutions. Such institutions will be
regulated by their special law, or in the absence of such laws or in the
case that some aspect is not contemplated, this law will apply. The
Secretary of Finance and Public Credit will be the entity competent to
interpret, apply and resolve, for administrative effects, any matter related
to the precepts contained in this law, and in general for any matter that
refers to bond institutions ...
Ley Federal de Instituciones de Fianzas ("L.F.I.F.") Art. 1
10. "The Secretary of Finance and Public Credit will be the competent entity
to interpret, for administrative effects, the precepts of this law, and through norms
of general observance, provide for any matter concerning this law." Ley del
Mercado de Valores ("L.M.V.") Art. 8.
11. The Ley General de Organizaciones y Actividades Auxiliares del Credito
provides:
This law will regulate the organization and functioning of the auxiliary
credit organizations, and it will be applied to the exercise of their
activities. The Secretary of Finance and Public Credit will be the
competent entity to interpret, for administrative effects, the precepts in
this law, and in general, for everything to this institution.
Ley General de Organizaciones y Actividades Auxiliares del Credito
("L.G.O.A.A.C.") Art. 1. "...It will be the exclusive competence of the Secretary
of Finance and Public Credit, the instrumentation of every measure relative to the
organization, as well as the functioning of the national credit auxiliary
organizations." Id. at Art. 2.
12. "The Federal Executive branch, through the Secretary of Finance and
Public Credit, may interpret, for administrative effects, the precepts of this law."
Ley de Instituciones de Credito ("L.I.C.") Art. 5.
13. The Ley de Instituciones de Credito ("L.I.C.") also states:
The authorization of the federal government is required in order to
organize and operate a multiple banking institution. The Secretary of
Finance and Public Credit is the entity in charge of granting such
authorization, subject to its discretion, once it has heard the opinion of
the Bank of Mexico and the National Banking and Securities
Commission. Because of their nature, such authorization is not
transmissible.
Id. at Art. 8.
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regulation. 4 Also, it can authorize the merger of two or more
multiple banking institutions,'5 revoke authorizations in certain
cases, and establish a term not to exceed sixty days for the repay-
ment of capital in the amount necessary to maintain the operation
of the institution within the legal limits. In matters of national
credit corporations, the Ministry has the power to issue the organic
regulations of each institution and to annually authorize the
operative and financial programs, their general expenditure and
investment budgets, and income estimations prepared by the
institutions.
2. National Banking and Securities Commission. The
National Banking and Securities Commission is an entity regulated
by its own law with technical autonomy and executive powers
decentralized from the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. 16 Its
purpose is to supervise and regulate, within the scope of its
competence, the stability and proper operation of financial entities,
as well as to maintain and promote the healthy and balanced
development of the financial system as a whole, while protecting
the interests of the public.1
7
This Commission is empowered to supervise financial entities
as well as individuals and other corporations when they perform
financial activities. The Commission also has the power to issue
regulations to which the entities shall submit, render rules for the
registration of operations applicable to the entities, determine the
rules for the estimation of assets and the obligations and
responsibilities of the entities under the terms set forth by the laws,
issue rules concerning the information that the entities must
periodically furnish and issue provisions of a general nature
establishing requirements for auditors and the content of their
reports.
The Commission is also vested with the power to act as a
consultant to the federal government in financial matters, to
14. The law further provides:
The multiple banking institutions, in which the federal government has
the control because of its equity participation must follow the guidelines
enacted by the Secretary of Finance and Public Credit, concerning the
making and approval of annual budgets, salaries, and other affairs subject
to their regulation.
Id. at Art. 20.
15. See id. at Art. 27.
16. "The National Banking and Securities Commission is created as a
decentralized organ of the Secretary of Finance and Public Credit with technical
and executive faculties autonomy within the terms of this law." L.C.N.B.V. Art. 1.
17. See L.C.N.B.V., supra note 3.
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authorize the incorporation, operation, and minimum capital of the
financial entities, to order the suspension of these entities under the
terms of the law enacted by the National Banking and Securities
Commission, and to place the entities under administrative or
managerial receivership in order to suspend, regularize or resolve
operations that endanger the solvency, stability, or liquidity of
those operations. 8
a. Oversight and Supervisory Powers of the National
Banking and Securities Commission. It is necessary to mention the
importance of the National Banking and Securities Commission's
power to conduct oversight or supervision. Its main purpose is "to
evaluate the risks to which the financial entities are subject, the
control and quality of their administration, the purpose of which
consists of maintaining adequate liquidity, solvency and stability
according to the legal provisions applicable to each institution and
in accordance with the healthy uses and practices of the financial
markets."19 This supervisory power is also aimed at assessing in a
consolidated manner the risks of grouped financial entities that
have property links and generally, the "adequate operation of the
financial system."2
b. National Banking and Securities Commission
Oversight Procedure. The Commission conducts oversight through
inspection visits, assessment of operations and audits of records and
systems at the facilities or their automated equipment to verify the
status of the entity. Oversight will also be conducted through
18. The Commission shall:
(I) supervise the entities, as well as natural persons and other juridical
persons when they realize any activity foreseen in the laws relating to the
financial system, (II) issue within the scope of its competence the
prudential regulation to which the entities shall submit, (III) render rules
for the registration of operations applicable to the entities, (IV)
determine the rules for the estimation of assets, and as the case may be,
of duties and responsibilities of the entities, under the terms set forth by
the laws, (V) issue provisions of a general nature, setting out the
characteristics and requirements to be fulfilled by the auditors of the
entities, and their reports..., (VIII) advise the federal government in
financial matters ... , (XI) authorize the creation and operation, as well as
determine the minimum equity capital requirements of the financial
entities.. ., (XIV) order the entities to cease operations, under the terms
of this law, (XV) place under administrative or managerial receivership
so as to suspend, regularize, or terminate operations puts into risk their
solvency, stability or liquidity, or those violating their enabling statute or
the provisions of a general nature emanating there from...
L.C.N.B.V. Art. 4.
19. See id. at Art. 5.
20. See id.
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analysis of the economic and financial information that the entities
must periodically send to the Commission. These updates measure
the overall health of the financial system.
Prevention and correction measures are carried out through
the establishment of programs that are to be fulfilled by the
financial entities. These programs are established when the entities
experience financial unbalance that may affect their liquidity,
solvency or stability. In any event, the programs can be imple-
mented by means of an agreement with the entities themselves. If
the programs are not fulfilled, the Commission may proceed to
place the entity under administrative or managerial receivership in
order to suspend, regularize, or resolve the operations endangering
the solvency, stability or liquidity of the institution.2'
The National Banking and Securities Commission is widely
empowered to supervise the proper operation of, among others, the
21. Art. 5 of L.C.N.B.V. further provides:
The supervision realized by the commission will be according to the
regulation that for such effect, issue the Federal Executive and will
include the faculties of inspection, surveillance, prevention and correction
which this law, as well as other laws and applicable precepts, confer to the
Commission. The supervision of the financial entities will have as a main
objective to evaluate the risks to which the financial entities are subject,
their systems of control and quality of their administration, so as to
procure that said entities maintain an adequate level of liquidity, be
solvent and stable and in general comply with the laws regulating them,
and to the uses and sound practices of the financial markets. Also,
through the faculty of supervision the risks undertaken by financial
consortiums or entities that have equity relations, will be assessed in a
consolidated way; as well as the general and adequate functioning of the
financial system. The inspection will be done through visits, verification
of operations, auditing of logs and systems, in the offices or computerized
systems of the financial entities, to verify their current status. The
surveillance will be performed through the analysis of the financial and
economical information, so as to measure possible effects on the financial
entities and on the financial system as a whole. The prevention and
correction will be done through the establishment of programs, of
mandatory observance for financial institutions with the purpose to
eliminate irregularities. Also, such programs will be established when a
financial entity shows signs of financial instability that might affect its
liquidity, solvency, or stability with the possibility of documenting the
program through agreement with the respective entity. The non-
compliance with such programs enables the commission to exercise the
faculty stated in Article 4, paragraph XV of this law; nevertheless, the
sanctions established in Article 108 of the Law of Credit Institutions. The
supervision realized by the Commission regarding natural persons and
other juridical persons when they realize activities foreseen in the laws
relative to the financial system, will have as a purpose that such persons





credit institutions. From a formal point of view, it should not be
possible for the financial institutions to perform prohibited or
unlawful activities.. I will analyze below, however, that in practice,
prohibited or unlawful activities occurred because the banks, in
particular, took actions that if timely detected and corrected would
not have resulted in the severe banking crisis suffered by Mexico.
3. Banco de M~xico. The Central Bank, which is known as
the Banco de M6xico, is a juridical person organized for public
purposes with an autonomous capacity.2 2 One of its purposes is to
supply the country's economy with domestic currency. To achieve
this purpose, it must foster the stability of currency and it must
promote the healthy development of the financial system and favor
the proper operation of the payment systems.24
The activities of the Banco de M6xico include regulating the
issuance and circulation of currency, establishing exchange rates,
performing intermediation, financial services and payment systems,
operating with credit instructions as a reserve bank and a lender of
last resort, providing treasury services to the federal government
and acting as a financial agent thereof, acting as an advisor to the
federal government in economic and particularly, in financial
matters, and participating in the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") and in other international financial entities.25
B. The Mexican Banking System
The Mexican Banking System consists of the Banco de M6xico,
the multiple banking institutions, the development banking
institutions, public trusts established by the federal government for
economic promotion and public trusts for economic promotion
created by the Banco de M6xico.26
22. "The Central Bank is an autonomous public law person and it will be
called the Bank of Mexico. In the exercise of its functions and in its
administration, the bank will act according to this law, regulatory of the sixth and
seventh paragraphs of Article 28 of the Constitution of the Mexican United
States." L.B.M. Art. 1.
23. "It is the exclusive attribution of the Bank of Mexico to issue legal tender
and order, as well as put in circulation such currency through the operations
authorized by this law." Id. at Art. 4.
24. See id. at Art. 2.
25. See L.B.M. Art. 3.
26. The Ley de Instituciones de Credito ("L.I.C.") provides:
The Mexican Banking System will be built-in by the Bank of Mexico, the
multiple banking institutions, the development banking institution, the
national savings trust, and the public trusts for economic promotion
constituted by the federal government, as well as by those constituted for
the accomplishment of the Bank of Mexico's functions which are created
[Vol. 106:1
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1. Banking and Credit. The Banking and Credit Service
provides monetary resources to the domestic market for private
lending through acts causing direct or contingent liabilities; the
intermediary being committed to pay the principal amount and, as
the case may be, the financial accessories of the resources
obtained.27 The Banking and Credit Service may only be composed
of credit institutions that are multiple banking institutions and
development banking institutions. 8
a. Development Banks. The development banking
institutions are entities of the federal public administration with
their own legal capacity and estate. They are incorporated with the
capacity as national credit corporations under the terms of their
relevant organic laws and of the Law of Credit Institutions. 9
The organic laws of each institution set forth the form of
organization and operation of its entities. Each institution must
annually prepare its operative and financial programs, which must
be submitted to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit for
authorization." The development bank institutions conduct
for that purpose.
Id. at Art. 3.
27. See L.I.C. Art. 2.
28. The banking and credit service can only be rendered by credit institutions,
which can be:
(I) Multiple banking institutions and (II) Development banking
institutions. For the purposes of this law, banking and credit services will
be the obtainment of resources from the domestic market for their
placement among the public, through direct or contingent liabilities acts,
being the intermediary obliged to pay back the principal amount, and as
the case may be, the financial accessories of the resources obtained.
Transactions realized by financial intermediaries, duly authorized, other
than credit institutions in the proper course of business will not be
considered banking and credit transactions. Such intermediaries will not
be able, in any case, to receive irregular money deposits in a checking
account.
Id.
29. See L.I.C. Art. 30.
30. The Ley de Instituciones de Credito ("L.I.C.") provides:
The development banking institutions are entities pertaining to the
Federal Public Administration, with their own juridical personality and
net worth, enacted as national credit corporations, according to the terms
of their organic regulation and this law. The Secretary of Finance and
Public Credit will issue the organic regulation for each institution, which
will state the basis of its organization and the relations between its
organs. The organic regulation and its amendments must be published in
the Official Gazette and register in the Commercial Public registry.
Id. at Art. 30.
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specialized activities authorized by the Congress of the Union in
their respective organic laws."
Because of government intervention and direct participation in
these institutions, the institutions became bureaucratized to such an
extent that their purposes and objectives were distorted and the
institutions entered a stage of financial lethargy. These institutions,
therefore, have been disappearing from the financial system to
make way for economic development and growth programs, both
by private banking institutions and by mercantile corporations or
specific social programs designed to bolster productive areas of the
economy.
b. Multiple Banking. When re-privatized, these
development banks become multiple banking institutions. The Law
of Credit Institutions recognizes as national credit corporations
those institutions that were customarily supported by the
government to promote the development of a certain field of the
national economy. An example would be Banrural in respect to the
agricultural sector. Fixed capital corporations that are incorporated
pursuant to the Law of Mercantile Corporations may operate as
multiple banking institutions with prior authorization from the
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit.32
31. The L.I.C. further provides:
The development banking institutions should elaborate, annually, their
operative and financial plans, general expenditure and investment
budgets, approximate income, which should be submitted to the approval
of the Secretary of Finance and Public Credit, according to the guidelines,
measures and mechanisms issued. The mentioned Secretary should
determine the pattern that each institution should follow, in relation to
the global assignation of expenditure financing established by the
Secretary of Planning and Budget. The programs should be formulated
according to the guidelines and objectives of the National Development
Plan, as well as by the sector programs of the stated plan.
Id. at Art. 31.
32. Authorizations will only be granted to anonymous corporations with fixed
equity capital, complying with the General Law of Commercial Corporations, the
norms of this law, and particularly with the following:
(I) Their activities will be the rendering of banking and credit services,
within the terms of this law; (II) Their term will be indefinite; (III) They
should meet with the minimum equity capital and equity capital required,
according to this law; and (IV) Their social domicile must be in this
country. Their enacting document, and any other amendment to such,
must be submitted to the approval of the Secretary of Finance and Public
Credit. Once the enacting document or amendment has been approved,
they must be registered in the Commercial Public Registry without any
judicial requirement necessary.
Id. at Art. 9.
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2. Bank Operations with Securities. Credit institutions that
carry out operations with securities listed in the National Securities
Register are subject to inspection and oversight by the National
Banking and Securities Commission33 with the intermediation of
brokerage houses.
a. Active Operations. Active operations are those that
involve credit guaranties, i.e., the pledge, surety, or any real right or
lien meeting the formalities of the credit agreements. Also
understood as active operations are those operations carried out by
the bank to extend credit secured by the capital previously received
from the clients or chargeable to its own estate within the margins
of the percentage allowed by the law.
b. Passive Operations. Passive operations are those that
do not involve a credit guaranty, pledge, surety, or any real right
under a credit agreement. Practically speaking, these are
operations where the bank intervenes to obtain capital from money
deposits in order to apply them to its own purposes, and it issues
debentures or cash bonds through which it becomes a debtor for
the received capital.
3. Auxiliary Credit Organizations.34 Financial intermediaries
other than credit institutions may carry out banking and credit
operations, provided that they are authorized by law. These
intermediaries in no event may receive money deposits in a
checking account.'
a. General Deposit Warehouses. The main purpose of a
General Deposit Warehouse is the storage, safeguarding,
preservation, handling, control, distribution, or marketing of goods
or merchandise under its custody or while in transit under a
certificate of deposit and financing guarantee." 36 These warehouses
may also perform value-added processes, and may transform,
repair, and assemble the merchandise in order to increase its value
without essentially varying its nature. 37 They are also "permitted to
issue certificates of deposit and pledge bonds.
3 8
33. See L.C.N.B.V., supra note 3.
34. "The following will be considered Auxiliary Credit Organizations: (I)
General Deposit Warehouses, (1I) Financial Leasing Companies, (III) Savings
and Credit Corporations, (IV) Credit Unions, (V) Financial Factoring
Companies, (VI) Any other that the laws consider as such." Ley General de
Organizaciones y Actividades Auxiliares del Credito" ("L.G.O.A.A.C.") Art.
3.
35. See L.I.C., supra note 28.





b. Financial Leasing Companies. The corporations
authorized as financial leasing companies may only enter into
financial lease agreements, acquire assets through financial leases,
acquire assets from the future lessee, and obtain loans and credits
from domestic or foreign credit, insurance, and bonding institutions
subject to a financial lease.39
c. Savings and Credit Corporations. The savings and
loan corporations raise capital exclusively from their partners,
through acts causing direct or contingent liabilities with the
corporation being compelled to repay the principal amount plus,
and as the case may be, interest on the capital. The capital shall be
held by the partners themselves or in investments favored by the
majority of partners.'
d. Credit Unions. Credit unions may only provide credit
to their partners, provide their guaranty or surety pursuant to the
applicable legal and administrative provisions, and receive loans
exclusively from their partners, foreign or domestic credit,
insurance and bonding institutions and their suppliers.41
39. The corporations authorized to operate as financial leasing companies
will only be allowed to perform the following transactions:
(I) Enter into financial leasing contracts, pursuant to article 25 of this law;
(II) Acquire assets to give them under financial lease agreements; (III)
Acquire assets from the future lessee with the commitment to give them
under financial lease to the latter; (IV) Obtain credit and loans from
credit, insurance, and bonding institution, from the country or from
foreign financial entities allocated to perform the transactions authorized
by this chapter, as well as from providers, manufacturers and builders of
assets destined to financial leasing agreements; (IV) Issue subordinate
obligations and other credit instruments, by series or in mass, to be
placed among the investing public; (V) Obtain credits and loans from
credit institutions, national or foreign, to liquidity needs related to their
business purpose; (VI) Repealed; (VII) Repealed; (VIII) Discount,
pledge, or negotiate credit instruments and affect the rights originating
from the financial lease contracts or from the transactions authorized to
companies with persons that receive financing, under the terms of section
IV, as well as constitute irrevocable trusts for the credit instruments and
rights originating from the financial lease contracts to guarantee the
payment of the securities issued according to section IV; (IX) Constitute
deposits, on demand or term, in credit institutions and foreign banks, as
well as acquire securities approved by the National Securities
Commission; (X) Acquire goods and real state destined to the use of their
offices; (XI) Any other authorized by the laws; (XII) Any other analog or
connected transactions, authorized though general rules by the Secretary
of Finance and Public Credit, with the opinion of the National Banking
Commission and the Bank of Mexico.
L.G.O.A.A.C. Art. 24.
40. Id. at Art. 38-B
41. See L.G.O.A.A.C. Art. 40.
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e. Financial Factoring Companies. Corporations
operating as financial factoring companies may only enter into
financial factoring agreements and obtain loans and credits from
foreign or domestic credit, insurance and bonding institutions to
carry out operations authorized by law or to cover liquidity needs
related to the corporate purpose. Financial factoring companies
may also issue subordinated obligations and other credit
instruments on a serial or volume basis for placement among the
investing public.42
This is how the Mexican banking system was established. The
institutions or corporations that directly or indirectly participated in
the banking system were aimed at fostering the social programs
promoted by the federal government, which was eagerly seeking to
control the institutions and the permanence of the capital in
Mexico. Unfortunately, this was not handled as expected.
4. The Result of Banking Nationalization. As noted, any
financial institution touched by the Mexican Federal Government
becomes distorted and eventually is lost. Through the
establishment of the means of operation and control mentioned
above, it was thought that the banking system in Mexico would be
the means to channel resources that would allow for the success of
national development programs implemented by the federal
government. The concept of a nationalized banking system
supported with the auxiliary credit organizations never worked
correctly.
The federal regulatory agencies were not respected. The
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the Banco de M6xico, and
the National Banking and Securities Commission neglected their
duties of control, administration, management and supervision of
the resources of the banking system, apparently favoring the
interests of economically powerful persons and groups. In view of
this situation, the federal government sold the banks, whereby the
banking system was re-privatized at an enormous profit. This
profit, however, was limited in comparison with the social
challenges posed by the internal and external debt.
If all the mechanisms and means of operation proposed for the
operation of the nationalized banking system had been entirely
respected and if the authorities of the Mexican financial system, the
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit ("SHCP"), the National
Banking and Securities Commission ("CNBV"), and the Banco de
Mexico ("BM") had performed their duties strictly in compliance
42. See id. at Art. 45-A.
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with the prevailing laws and economic order, the outcome of the
measures taken by the federal government would have been
favorable for the Mexican economy.
III. Banking System Savings Protection Fund
A. Nature
The Banking System Savings Protection Fund
("FOBAPROA") was a trust established within the Banco de
M6xico. The supreme decision making body of the FOBAPROA is
a nine member Technical Committee consisting of four representa-
tives of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, two represent-
atives of the Banking and Securities Commission and three
representatives of the Banco de M6xico.
B. Background of the Banking Fund
The Fund for the Preventive Support to the Multiple Banking
Institutions ("FONAPRE") was created in 1986. FONAPRE was
contemplated in Article 77 of the Regulatory Law of the Public
Banking and Credit Service, enacted in January 1985 and amended
in December 1989. This law stipulated that the Multiple Banking
Institutions must participate in the preventive support mechanism
in order to preserve their financial stability.
Article 122 of the Law of Credit Institutions established the
Banking System Savings Protection Fund as follows: "the Multiple
Banking Institutions must participate in the savings preventive and
protective mechanism." On November 10, 1986, the agreement
that gave rise to the FONAPRE was signed. FONAPRE was
established pursuant to Article 77 of the Regulatory Law of the
Public Banking and Credit System, in accordance with the following
principles: the federal government, represented by the Ministry of
Programming and Budget (now integrated into the Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit), shall be the grantor; the Banco de
M6xico as trustee; and the banks in the system shall be the
beneficiaries.
The actions taken by FONAPRE solved some problems of the
banking system, because the resources of the fund made available
additional credits to banks suffering capitalization problems. These
credits were for use toward the subscription of patrimonial contri-
bution certificates ("CAPS"), loans to the net capital of the banks,
in order to facilitate a reactivation of the banks' unproductive assets
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such as an overdue portfolio. In addition, they allowed different-
iated support for social-interest housing portfolios and other forms
of indemnification assistance. The banks supported by FONAPRE,
however, posted operating losses that translated into short-term
and structural problems.
The name and attributions of the fund changed because of the
legal reform of the financial system in 1990 reprivatizing the
commercial banking system. The fund now remains as the Banking
System Savings Protection Fund ("FOBAPROA").
Article 122 of the Law of Credit Institutions stipulated the
establishment of the FOBAPROA as follows:
Multiple Banking Institutions must participate in the savings
preventive and protective mechanism, the organization and
operation whereof shall be subject to the following:
I. Banco de Mdxico shall administrate a trust to be known as
Banking System Savings Protection Fund, whose purpose shall
be the performance of preventive operations designed to avoid
financial problems that may be experienced by the Multiple
Banking Institutions, as well as to foster the fulfillment of the
obligations chargeable to said Institutions, express subject
matter of protection by the fund.
C. Purpose of FOBAPROA
FOBAPROA's purpose was to protect the stability of the
banking institutions so as to ensure not only the participation of the
depositors, but also that of all the creditors of the banking system
and the shareholders of the institutions. Within the scope of its
authority, the fund was to perform preventive operations designed
to avoid financial problems experienced by the banks and to
promote the fulfillment of each bank's obligations to the fund, to its
clientele, to its creditors and to other related entities. Thus, the
fund's duty, at least as contemplated in the law, consisted not only
of the administration of its assets, but also, in conjunction with the
financial authorities, duties of supervision, diagnosis and assess-
ment of the banking system, including the Banco de M6xico, the
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the National Banking
and Securities Commission. The fund was also to rehabilitate,
administer and protect the assets of the institutions and to resolve
problems of the banking system caused by the underlying
circumstances of the market.
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Programs were designed and implemented to cope with the
then-prevailing economic and monetary situation in Mexico. Such
programs addressed liquidity in dollars, temporary capitalization
("PROCAPTE") and capitalization through the purchase of credit
portfolios. Article 122 of the Law of Credit Institutions granted
FOBAPROA both property and corporate rights in the stock taken
as a guaranty, with the proceeds from the property rights inuring to
the fund. The mere creation of the trust by the federal government
did not establish it as an entity of the public administration. This
aspect of the FOBAPROA is very important because it makes
inapplicable the legislation generally applied to entities of public
administration and it relieves FOBAPROA officers from
compliance with the laws governing the responsibilities of Public
Officers.
D. Form of Operation
The characteristics and general guidelines of the operation of
FOBAPROA were established during this stage. As one of its
characteristics, FOBAPROA did not need to wait for bank
requests before granting financial support. Instead, the organ-
ization could act in a preventive manner based on information it
received from the oversight system contemplated for the National
Banking and Securities Commission. Therefore, the institutions
that received support would have to guarantee that support with
their capital stock or with government securities. When the assisted
institutions used capital stock as a guaranty, the trust received the
bank shares at seventy-five percent of their book value as shown by
the latest financial statement approved by the boards of directors of
the respective banks and by the National Banking and Securities
Commission.
In return, the banking institutions pledged to furnish the fund
with requested information to make known to the fund any
problem they experienced which would require the support of the
fund itself. To discourage the extension of dollar credit lines with
restrictive rates and short-term maturities to the Mexican banks, a
rate reduction mechanism was established that was applicable to
the extent the institutions decreased their disbursed amounts.
E. FOBAPROA Result
Amidst their failure to fulfill the imposed conditions and
objectives, other obviously weak banks soon joined the banks
immersed in the fund. The fund then intended to facilitate the
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bank re-capitalization process by means of legal amendment to the
structure of financial groups, banks and brokerage houses to allow
for greater capital flows in the institutions.
Encouraged by the purchase of a foreign investment portfolio,
the federal government, through the fund, implemented and
operated the capitalization program; an operation that has
continued since June 1995. The program spurred the capitalization
of banks through the purchase of a portfolio by FOBAPROA at
the net value of reserves and liquidation of the portfolio with ten-
year debt documents. These transactions were guaranteed by the
federal government on the condition that the institution would
allocate resources to the capital at a two-to-one ratio and that it
would remain under the supervision of a committee formed by the
authorities, the banks themselves and FOBAPROA.
A debt-restructuring program was also put together to root out
a culture of nonpayment. This involved a major fiscal sacrifice, on
the basis of inflation-indexed investment units ("UDI's"), for the
national economy, states, municipalities and for housing debtors.
Additionally, the immediate bank debtors' support program
("ADE") was designed to relieve the credit situation of small bank
debtors and was instrumental in keeping up-to-date or regularizing
the credit situation of millions of bank borrowers. Unfortunately,
the ADE was of a limited nature in various sectors such as
agriculture.
A unit operating as an "amicable compounder" was created for
large debtors to coordinate the banking-entrepreneurial agree-
ments. These measures reduced the overdue portfolio ratios and
improved the banks' capitalization level.
Being certain that the rescue of the banking system carried out
in 1995 by the federal government prevented the collapse of the
financial system, the President of the Republic justified the bailout
of the financial institutions with public resources as necessary to
avoid an economic recession worse than that suffered in 1993 and
1994. Failure to take this measure would have caused chain
bankruptcies and a massive loss of jobs because credit access and
deposit withdrawals would have been hampered. The bailout
enabled the government to have in place an exchange and
monetary policy that would avoid an imbalance of payments and
price instability. Nevertheless, despite all of these measures, the
consequences of the crisis are reflected in the shutdown or
bankruptcy of companies and the loss of real estate and personal
property by individuals who, notwithstanding credit restructuring or
debtor support programs, were unable to pay their debts.
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The bailout led to a slight recovery of the public balance, but
the banking system was still vulnerable due to vice and
mismanagement. Turmoil and discussion followed the bailout on
the subject of FOBAPROA because uncertainty had been
introduced into the financial markets. In view of the steep cost of
the bailout, strong discussions were also held in the Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate.
The banks immersed in the FOBAPROA, for example,
Bancomer, Banca Cremi, Banca Union, Banca Serfin, Banca
Confia, Banamex, Banco Del Atlintico, Banco Obrero, as well as
various brokerage houses, received the benefits of the fund.
FOBAPROA absorbed the liabilities of these institutions, with the
exception of Inbursa and Citibank-the former because it repaid its
credits and the latter because it was a foreign bank.
This measure favored all of the banks. The representatives in
the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, however, took different stances
about the possibility of converting the bank liabilities absorbed by
the fund into the public debt.
In order to defend the official position, the Minister of Finance
and Public Credit appeared before the Chamber of Deputies and
recognized that only thirty percent of the 552 billion pesos of
FOBAPROA liability was recoverable. Because of the foregoing,
the representatives at the Chamber of Deputies requested
FOBAPROA's director to deliver relevant information about the
persons directly involved in the authorization and about the
persons favored by the irrecoverable credits. FOBAPROA's
director answered negatively to this request, arguing that disclosure
would violate the "Banking Secret."
After a long, chaotic and acrimonious session, the Chamber of
Deputies and the Chamber of Senators voted to allow the
government to absorb the debts of FOBAPROA. This represents
public debt that will not be fully recovered until the year 2025.
F. Various Scenarios About FOBAPROA
1. Political-Economical Scenario. Because FOBAPROA
debts could now become part of the public debt, the matter was
submitted to the Chamber of Deputies in the Congress where it was
the subject of various political and economic considerations.
First, the debate about FOBAPROA started when a
representative of the Chamber of Deputies asked why the audit of
the trust had not been commenced. He also stated that the amount
of the fund affects the well-being of the people and that it has
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financial repercussions in the pockets of Mexicans because the
accounting process was on hold. He argued that the delay
permitted the executive to replace the fund portfolio, which was
guaranteed in a fictitious manner. The representative proposed
that the greater cost of the fund debt should be carried forward
against the future profits of the banking institutions and to the
property of the instruments of the credits involved in the overdue
portfolios.
In response, another representative of the Chamber of
Deputies argued that his party would not endorse the conversion of
the fund liabilities into public debt, proposing instead to support
the debtors and the banks, so as to have a firm and solid financial
system supporting the economic growth of the country.
The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit recognized that only
thirty percent of FOBAPROA's liabilities was recoverable. The
Minister stated that the government's intervention contributed to
keep both the Mexican economy and the financial system from
collapsing. He also stated that thirteen out of eighteen banks
became totally bankrupt. The Chamber representatives that were
gathered there declared that the "Banking Secret" protects special
interests and does not allow for free access to solve the problem. A
new session of the Chamber was called as a result of these differing
opinions.
The fourth State of the Nation Report, dated December 1998,
urged passage of the financial package, by accepting that a
substantial part of the banking debt was due to the negligence and
fraud of bank managers, executives and shareholders during the
banking system nationalization period. The report stressed that the
government could not choose between the cost of avoiding the
banking system bankruptcy and the cost that would result if the
system failed.
The executive proposed to create a deposit guarantee fund as a
substitute for FOBAPROA. This proposed fund would protect
small and medium savers, convert the 552 billion pesos in
FOBAOROA liabilities into public debt, fully empower Banco de
M6xico in matters of exchange policy and wind up the National
Bank of Internal Commerce as a National Credit Society due to its
inefficient operation as a development bank.
After the resignation of the President of the National Banking
and Securities Commission and the Governor of Banco de M6xico,
three of the main political forces proposed to have the large trust
credits audited. They also proposed the creation of an organization
to protect savings deposits of not more than fifty billion pesos and
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to subsidize interest rates for minor debtors in consumer,
automobile, public transportation, farming and merchant credits.
In addition, they proposed an audit of FOBAPROA's assets in
order to allocate the fund's economic costs equitably among banks,
debtors and taxpayers.
2. Juridical Scenario. Auditor Mackey stated that he did not
come to make an audit of FOBAPROA's operations, but to
conduct a financial review. No audit took place because he did not
have all of the information required to conduct an audit.
The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit justified the absence
of information regarding Banca Union, Banca Serfin, Bancomer,
Banamex, Banpais and Bancrecer, on the basis of the banking
secret, at least where the accounts were fully justified. This answer
prevented the discovery of unlawful acts committed by the
Revolutionary Institutional Party ("PRI") to finance the
presidential campaign, and other acts that fostered unlawful
behavior by public servants. This misbehavior increased the
banking debt, the fiscal cost and the attendant public debt owed by
all Mexicans.
The National Banking and Securities Commission ("CNBV")
timely identified the problems surrounding the Mexican banking
and financial system, but its failure to make decisions has translated
into fiscal cost. Hence, it can be contended that although the law
regulating the duties of the CNBV clearly specifies its obligations,
such as that of surveillance and inspection, the CNBV did not
properly fulfill those duties. Namely, it failed to strictly enforce the
law in matters of supervision of the banking system.
Banking executives committed numerous violations. By
furnishing false information on the amount of their assets and
including false information on real estate and companies that did
not have payment capacity, these executives obtained massive loans
without appropriate bank security. The Mackey report stated that
twenty-four billion pesos out of the total credits should have not
been reported to FOBAPROA. According to the report, this
occurred because the National Banking and Securities Commission
relaxed the original terms of the relevant agreements to permit the
trust to accept low quality, dubious credits, thereby failing to
comply with the provisions of the law and of the National Banking
and Securities Commission in matters of guaranties. Although it is
true that the failure could have eventually resided in the non-
fulfillment of banking regulations by the credit institutions,
particularly with respect to the granting of credits with their
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respective guaranties, it is also true that the supervising authority
acted poorly.
Forty percent of the bank credits acquired by FOBAPROA
and guaranteed by the federal government are denominated in
dollars, evidencing the fragility of the liabilities of the fund and of
the federal government, because a devaluation would result in a
fiscal crisis. The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit determined
that the cost of the banking bailout may amount to seventy billion
dollars, but it insisted on the bailout because Mexico would have
otherwise suffered a catastrophic economic crisis. As for the
operations in the amount of 24,700 billion pesos classified as
irregular, the audit report pointed out that many of these
operations can be classified as illegal by the IPAB and returned to
the banks, thereby reducing the cost of the banking system rescue.
It seems, however, that a decision is still to be made in this respect.
Both the federal government and the bankers proposed
amendments to the bankruptcy laws, the law of guaranties and to
procedures allowing banks to enforce judicial credit collection as
additional measures to capitalize banks. In this regard, it is worth
mentioning that now the Law of Mercantile Bankruptcies, in force
since May 13, 2000, stipulates the creation of the Federal Institute
of Specialists in Mercantile Bankruptcies, whose purpose is, inter
alia, to avoid the bankruptcy of many companies, to preserve jobs
and resources, and to clean up the economy. This new law grants
the merchant support from the State, allowing continued
operation.43 Furthermore, this law creates the Conciliator and the
43. The Federal Institute of Specialists in Mercantile Bankruptcies is
created as an auxiliary organ of the Federal Judgeship Council, with technical
and operative autonomy, with the following attributions:
(I) Authorize the registration in the corresponding registry of the
persons, who fulfill the necessary requisites to perform the functions of
visitor, conciliator, and inspector in the mercantile bankruptcy
proceedings; (II) Create and keep the registries of visitors, conciliators
and inspectors; (III) Revoke, according to this law, the authorization to
perform the functions of visitor, conciliator, and inspector in the
mercantile bankruptcy proceedings; (IV) Designate the persons who will
perform the functions of visitor, conciliator, and inspector in each
bankruptcy proceeding, among the ones registered in the corresponding
registries; (V) Establish by general rules, the proceedings for the random
designation of the visitors, conciliators and inspectors; (VI) Elaborate
and apply the public proceedings for selection and updating for the
authorization to be a visitor, conciliator or inspector, who shall previously
publish the criteria in the Official Gazette; (VII) Establish the applicable
regime for the remuneration of the visitors, conciliators and inspectors
for the services rendered in the mercantile bankruptcy proceedings;
(VIII) Supervise the services rendered by the visitors, conciliators and
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Inspector, whose duties are, among others, to promote agreements
between the parties in conflict (merchant and creditors) in order to
make it possible for the merchant to subsist. Concilators and
Inspectors propose one or several plans for the payment of the
merchants' obligations and verify the proven insolvency of a
company before it is declared under bankruptcy. These are
protective norms provided by the State to guarantee and preserve
the existence of the estate of the merchant and, in turn, the survival
of the national industry.
The laws enable faster collection from the assets of the
debtors. The lack of payment capacity will thus increase the
concentration of the national property in the hands of the bankers,
with a resulting adverse impact on the industrial and agricultural
producers and the eventual jeopardy of economic recovery and
employment generation.
For the first time in the parliamentary history of the country,
the Commission of Internal Regime and Political Accord
("CRICP") of the Chamber of Deputies lodged a complaint with
the President of the Republic against the heads of the Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit and the CNBV. The CRICP asked that
these agencies furnish the auditor with the requested information
necessary to conclude the audit.
The complaint caused the Minister of Finance and Public
Credit to appear at the platform of the Parliamentary Chamber.
Before a quorum of 303 lawmakers, and for five and a half hours
the Minister emphasized that Mexico is absolutely trusted,
particularly because it had timely reacted to unforeseen threats
from abroad, such as the drop in international oil prices, financial
volatility and internal social and economic phenomena. However,
the audits to the Banking System Savings Protection Fund show
that the mistakes of the present government will saddle taxpayers
inspectors in the mercantile bankruptcy proceedings; (IX) Promote the
training and updating of the visitors, conciliators and inspectors,
registered in the corresponding registries; (X) Conduct and support
analysis, studies and investigations related with their functions; (XI)
Make known to the public its functions, objectives and proceedings as
well as the rules issued according to this law; (XII) Elaborate and diffuse
statistics related to bankruptcy proceedings; (XIII) Issue general rules
necessary to exercise the attributions stated in sections IV, V, VII, and XI
of this article; (XIV) Inform the Congress of the Union, every six months,
about the performance of its functions; and (XV) Any other granted by
this law.
Ley de Concursos Mercantiles y de Reformas al Art. 88 de la Ley Organica
del Poder Judicial de la Federacion ("L.C.M.") Art. 311.
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and the Mexican nation with a debt of at least seventy-eight billion
dollars.
The concern over the financial system has given rise to new
rules for supervision and control at banking entities. Generally,
these rules have created ad hoc institutions in charge of stated
duties. These institutions have focused on paving the way for a
healthy and well-balanced development of the financial entities and
on protecting the interests of individuals. One example is the
National Banking and Securities Commission.
Recent experience, however, confirms the need to review and
to improve the supervisory and regulatory efforts of the financial
entities themselves. There is also a need to establish rules designed
to preserve the liquidity, solvency, security, confidence and honesty
of the financial and banking entities.
In summary, an efficient internal and external system is needed
to avoid, to the extent possible, bankruptcies or damage to the
financial sector at large and to the public interest. In this sense, we
contend that the State's duty is to ensure that the private sector is
socially responsible and to ensure that the private sector
subordinates itself to the common benefit. The State has a clear
duty to guide, protect and maintain a fair and efficient organization
of the various forces and instruments naturally promoting economic
development.
In view of these arguments and the well-known banking
problem, lawmakers were forced to put forth a series of
amendments and additions to various legal codes to create efficient
and effective regulation of the banking system, and particularly, to
eliminate so called "white collar" crimes. This criminal conduct has
greatly damaged the national economy and imperiled some
institutions of the Mexican financial system to the point that the
state must now develop adequate means to correct the problem.
The social environment surrounding the banking problem
jeopardizes the healthy management of banking entities thereby
adversely impacting their financial balance and credibility. In view
of this problem, it is essential to modify the scheme of financial
crimes. These crimes should be classed as felonies carrying stricter
penalties. In order to uphold the national interest, the legislation
must provide for the adequate management of the Mexican
financial system and must avoid, in the future, all types of related
crimes.
Those positioned to commit this type of crime are
knowledgeable in financial and banking matters, and are positioned
to involve their employees or persons of confidence in this criminal
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conduct. Because typifying these crimes is difficult, the legislation
currently in force demands change and reform in this and in other
areas.
The establishment of rules and norms must lead to a human
and social development in the public interest. Such a course of
action obviously hinges upon knowledge of the prevailing conduct
with respect to the banking problem and with respect to the various
operations of the financial entities.
The following aspects were considered in order to achieve the
foregoing objectives: a wide-ranging review of the Criminal Code to
define new financial crimes among the officers entrusted with the
supervision and surveillance of the financial system; an increase in
the severity of penalties; an extension of the statutes of limitations
for financial crimes and a necessary reassessment of those officers'
conduct to bring them in line with the general context of the
legislation.
G. Transfer of FOBAPROA-IPAB Credits
Following the publication of the Banking Savings Protection
Law, the trust known as the Banking System Savings Protection
Fund will continue to manage the operations of the "capitalization
and portfolio purchase" program so as to conclude the audits
ordered by the Chamber of Deputies. The audit report will identify
criminal offenders and others responsible for the crisis in the
financial market.
Institutions may cancel the agreements and operations they
maintained with FOBAPROA by returning the credit instruments
(promissory notes) issued in their favor, with the fund returning the
collection rights. The Banking Savings Protection Institute
("IPAB") will grant the institutions and persons a payment
guaranty or instrument covering the legally established collection
rights. If the IPAB detects any illegal credits, it may reject and
return the credit instruments to the Institutions, which must
designate different assets, to the satisfaction of the IPAB, for an
amount equivalent to that of the returned credits.
Further, the IPAB may reduce the amount of the respective
payment guaranty or instrument. If the unlawfulness of the credit is
attributable to the management of IPAB, the institution absorbs
the cost of the credit and the Institute will reduce the amount of the
payment guaranty or method.
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IV. Banking Savings Protection Institute
A. Nature
The IPAB is an entity decentralized from the federal public
administration with its own legal capacity and estate entrusted with
the management of the banking savings protection system, that is,
the liabilities in the possession of FOBAPROA."4
B. Purpose of IPAB
The IPAB is aimed at providing financial institutions with a
banking savings protection system to guarantee the payment of the
obligations established in the law. In addition, the IPAB
administers the financial cleanup programs prepared and executed
to benefit the savers and users of the institutions and to safeguard
the national payment system.
The IPAB was created to clean up the financial systems in
substitution for FOBAPROA. The IPAB absorbed the overdue
portfolio of the trust itself. The issuance of savings protection
bonds is an essential element of the IPAB's strategy to consolidate
the financial system in the medium term.
In approving the Banking Savings Protection Law, enacted on
January 19, 1999, the legislature entrusted three fundamental
missions to the IPAB. First, the IPAB was to design limited
deposit protection insurance, an objective shared with most of its
peer institutions in the world.45 The legislature also chose to entrust
two other objectives upon the IPAB, which are not always shared
with deposit insurance entities in the rest of the world. The first of
these was to manage the assumed debt from the banking rescue; the
second was to manage the asset repossession program while seeking
and maximize repossession in the shortest amount of time.
The Congress authorized the IPAB to use refinancing as the
instrument to manage liabilities. The IPAB was to refinance the
44. "The system for protection of bank savings will be administer by a
decentralized organ of the Federal Administration, with its own juridical
personality and assets, its domicile will be in the Federal District and is called
the Institute for Protection of Bank Savings." Ley de Proteccion al Ahorro
Bancario ("L.P.A.B.") Art. 2.
45. "For the purposes of this law, guaranteed obligations will be
considered deposits, credit and loans referred to in Sections I and 1I of Article
46 of the Law of Credit Institutions. The institutions have the duty to inform
users of their services about the type and amount of the guaranteed
obligations, according to the terms of this law." Id. at Art. 6.
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debt previously contracted, seeking three fundamental objectives:
(1) that the IPAB should always be in a position to fulfill its
contractual obligations; (2) that the cleanup and sale process of
Serfin and Bancrecer should be consolidated; and (3) that the debt
maturity profile should be improved and that liquidity should be
injected into liabilities now being financed by the banks.
C. Form of Operation
The provisions of the Banking Savings Protection Law govern
the constitution, operation, control and assessment of the Banking
Savings Protection Institute. To exercise its powers, the IPAB will
have a Board of Governors, an Executive Secretary, Adjunct
Secretaries, an Internal Control Organ and General Directors.
The IPAB began to issue bonds with the intention of
refinancing its liabilities. The Banco de M6xico is the financial
agent in the issuance of such bonds. According to Article 2 of the
Law of Revenues, the Central Bank can use resources of the
Treasury of the Federation to meet maturities.
All in all, the bonds are identical to federal government
development bonds, with a rate subject to review every twenty-
eight days, but the issuer thereof is the Institute. The Banco de
Mexico is the placement agent. The maturity term of these instru-
ments is three years with the base Cetes (Treasury Certificates) rate
at twenty-eight days and the face value at 100 pesos. Finally, the
amortization base is upon maturity and on the face value.
In summary, the bond instruments can be acquired by all those
who can purchase government securities now and by any national
or foreign individual or corporation. All authorized institutions
that can participate in the primary auction of the federal govern-
ment will participate in the primary market. Basically, the
remaining institutions that now have access to government
securities can participate in the secondary market. The IPAB has a
program that contemplates the issuance of between sixty and eighty
billion pesos in bonds annually, depending on market conditions.
The contingent payment mechanism normally works as
follows: upon maturity of principal and interest, the IPAB deposits
the resources in the Banco de Mexico and the latter pays off the
bond holders. Should any contingency occur, the Banco de Mexico
would automatically charge the Treasury of the Federation and pay
off the bond holders. The sovereign guaranty of the IPAB's bonds
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is established pursuant to Article 45 of the Banking Savings
46Protection Law.
Article 47 of the same legal code sets forth the obligation of
the Chamber of Deputies to allocate sufficient budgetary resources
so that the IPAB fulfills its obligations.47 In addition, Article 2 of
the Law of Revenues empowers the Banco de M6xico as the
placement agency in these transactions. It is contemplated that the
Banco de M6xico will make an automatic contingent charge to the
Treasury of the Federation. These bonds serve to make reportable
everything that is done now with government securities.
D. Board of Governors
The Board of Governors will be composed of seven members,
namely: the Minister of Finance and Public Credit, the Governor
of the Banco de M6xico, the President of the Commission, and four
members designated by the Federal Executive, who must be
approved by two thirds of the members of the Chamber of
Senators.
E. Executive Secretary
The Executive Secretary is the head of the Institute and is
appointed by the Board of Governors. The Executive Secretary is
in charge of the technical and administrative direction of the IPAB.
The Adjunct Secretaries, the Units and the General Directors assist
the Secretary with these duties.
46. The Ley de Proteccion al Ahorro Bancario ("L.P.A.B.") provides in
pertinent part:
If the institute cannot meet its obligations, the Congress of the Union will
adopt the appropriate measures to pay for the guaranteed obligations and
for the financing referred to in this article. This guaranty should be made
visible, according to the terms of this law, in the credit or other
instruments in which such obligations are documented.
Id. at Art. 45.
47. The L.P.A.B. further provides:
According to Article 74 Section IV of the Political Constitution of the
Mexican United States, the Chamber of Deputies will provide, by request
of the Federal Executive, in a special provision of the Federal
Expenditure Budget, a budget assignation required by the institute to
meet the obligations guaranteed and the financing referred to in the
article above.




The Adjunct Secretaries manage the financial cleanup
programs for which the IPAB is responsible. Another task is to
request financial support for the institutions in order to provide the
liquidity or cleanup of those institutions.
G. Powers
The IPAB is the party that assumes the institutional
obligations in accordance with the provisions of its own law. The
Federation authorizes the budget and expenditures of the IPAB.
These resources support the fulfillment of the obligations that the
Institute may have contracted for under the terms set forth by the
law.
The IPAB program supports depositors and debtors by
avoiding non-fulfillment of obligations. The IPAB will subscribe
and acquire common shares, subordinated obligations convertible
into shares and other credit instruments issued by the institutions it
supports.
One of the fundamental purposes of the IPAB is the financial
cleanup, for which purpose it subscribes credit instruments,
performs credit operations, grants guaranties and sureties and
assumes obligations. It performs these tasks for the benefit of both
the institutions and the corporations in whose capital the IPAB
directly or indirectly holds a stake.
H. Obligations
The IPAB guarantees deposits, loans and credits set forth in
the Law of Credit Institutions. Because the deposits, loans and
credits are guaranteed, the institutions must inform customers
about the type and amount of such obligations under the terms of
the Banking Savings Protection Law. '8 The IPAB's duty is to pay
the liquid and enforceable guaranteed obligations in the event of a
liquidation or bankruptcy.
I. Oversight
Any Chamber of the Congress of the Union is empowered to
demand the appearance of the Executive Secretary of IPAB as part
of its investigation of financial and banking entities.
4& See L.P.A.B., supra note 45.
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J. IPAB Scenario
One of the main points in FOBAPROA's case is the list of
those responsible for the debt. There have been questions as to
whether the list provided by the auditor to the Chamber of
Deputies contains complete information. This issue impacts the
Mexican people at large. One of the mysteries discussed in the
Chamber of Deputies, brought up mainly by the opposition, is the
creation of the IPAB itself, because it is said that the IPAB will be
the instrument to protect the bankers to the detriment of society.
A political party accused the Federal Executive of using funds
from trusts of all the banks to support his presidential campaign.
Significantly, the Minister of Finance and Public Credit is
considered to be legally prevented from delivering to the Chamber
of Deputies the information related to the Banco Uni6n trusts that
were created in favor of the official party during the 1994
presidential campaign because delivery would violate the trust and
banking secrets. Consequently, some deputies qualified the audit
made by the Canadian specialist as illegal, because the National
Banking and Securities Commission apparently wished to negotiate
the result, and Congress is the competent entity that should review
FOBAPROA's operations.
The bankruptcy of Serfin, a leading Mexican bank, impacted
the entire banking system due to the failure of the Congressional
strategy. In the political arena, some parties argue that the
persistence of the banking crisis makes it imperative that the
Executive and the Congress of the Union agree upon a new
strategy to resolve the de-capitalization of the Credit Institutions.
The cleanup of the banks Atlantico, Bancrecer and Promex
cost 124 billion pesos. The bankruptcy of these institutions could
have generated very serious consequences for the economy,
employment and the distribution of wealth.
The reviewing commission appointed by the Chamber of
Deputies stated that during this administration, the financial system
caused a presidential-term crisis because only twenty-nine percent
of the institutions are capitalized. Another reason for the crisis is
that sixty-five percent of the institutions have maintained an
overdue portfolio. As a result, a daily record is kept specifying the
risk value of each of the ten operational Mexican banks.
Mexico is a country building its democracy and it is getting
closer to a change in the presidential administration, a necessary
step to the success of the existing reforms. The administration
change is also necessary to introduce new reforms that will clean up
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the economy. As of August 1999, the cost to the Mexican taxpayers
to clean up the banking system increased to 730 billion pesos.
Furthermore, many feel that the National Banking and
Securities Commission permitted the alteration of sale statements
and the concealment of information. The IPAB answered this
allegation by itself contributing resources to cover the losses
estimated by the Commission. It is, however, worth mentioning
that analysts agree on the need to correct the legal loopholes in the
Mexican banking system to prevent a government bailout of failing
financial institutions.
Other people find IPAB's intervention positive because the
shareholders cannot channel money to themselves, and because
foreign investors are not interested in participating. The truth is,
however, that the inefficiency of the banking system discourages
investment in Mexico.
FOBAPROA's audit revealed that the authority did not fulfill
its responsibility to supervise banking operations. This revelation
unleashed the banking system's collapse because the National
Banking and Securities Commission permitted the falsification of
account statements and the concealment of information.
Should the IPAB succeed in its objectives, it will achieve a
sustainable debt administration scheme that is cost-effective,
enabling Mexico to consolidate its financial system.
The savings protection bonds provide several advantages: they
are guaranteed by the sovereign, they are reportable government
securities and, in view of the large volume of issuances expected to
be made by the Institute during the year, a resulting market with
projected high trading ratios is likely to emerge.
K. IPAB Today
The Chamber of Deputies is still debating budgetary outlays
related to the bailout. Based on the audit contracted by the
Chamber of Deputies, the Chamber is also debating the "banking
and trust secret" and the names of those included in the reportable
credit portfolio.
This list of names suggests that there are debtors with the
ability to pay. Their debts however, have been assumed by the
State and must be paid by the current and future citizens of Mexico.
There is also evidence of unsecured credits that fail to comply with
the most elementary banking standards. Although banks are
responsible, the authorities in charge of supervising the financial
institutions are also responsible, and the noncompliance is
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aggravated by discretionary decisions of the officers of the Banco
de M6xico, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the
National Banking and Securities Commission, which is acting as an
instrument of FOBAPROA.
The Executive Members of IPAB reported that the vast
majority of the 422 questionable credits, a cost in excess of forty-
two billion pesos, could no longer be prosecuted. However, three
hundred of these debts can still be prosecuted and recovered.
The foregoing indicates that the attempts of the Chamber of
Deputies to identify the complete list of FOBAPROA debtors have
been fruitless. One reason is because the list includes the names of
powerful Mexican politicians and businessmen, who made sure that
they would not be punished.
Most of IPAB's liabilities mature between 2006 and 2007 and
will result in an inevitable restructuring. This calls for a negotiation
of the entire debt to gain some flexibility allowing for fulfillment of
the debt within the next twenty years. The holder of the presidency
will bequeath to his successor a debt equivalent to 84 percent of the
Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"), an amount well in excess of the
1988-1994 presidential period. This is clearly an accumulation of
debt that will be impossible to repay and very difficult to collect.
V. National Commission for the Protection and Defense of the
Users of Financial Services (CONDUSEF)
A. Powers
The National Commission for the Protection and Defense of
the Users of Financial Services ("CONDUSEF") is empowered to
act as an arbitrator in conflicts submitted to its jurisdiction and to
provide equity in the relations between consumers and the financial
institutions.
B. Purpose
CONDUSEF is a public decentralized entity with legal
capacity and assets of its own. It was created on January 18, 1998
through enactment of the Law for the Protection and Defense of
the Users of Financial Services. 9 CONDUSEF absorbed the
49.The Ley de Proteccion y Defensa al Usuario de Servicios Financieros
("L.P.D.U.S.F.") provides in pertinent part:
The protection of rights and interests of Users, will be carried out by
decentralized public organism, with its own juridical personality and
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powers previously enjoyed by the National Banking and Securities
Commission, the National Insurance and Bonding Commission and
the Retirement Savings System Commission, in matters of
complaints and consultations by the users of the Mexican financial
system. CONDUSEF is aimed at promoting, advising, protecting
and defending the rights and interests of the people using or
contracting for a product or service offered by the financial
institutions that operate within Mexico and to promote among the
users a culture open to banking operations and services.
CONDUSEF has full technical autonomy to render decisions
and awards and is empowered to impose penalties provided by law.
CONDUSEF strengthens the security of financial consumers in
both the operations they carry out and in the relations they keep
with the financial institutions. A user is defined as a person
contracting, using, or, for any other reason, entitled to a product or
service offered by some financial institution duly authorized and
classified as a Credit Institution and their auxiliary institutions, as
well as for any other corporation that offers a financial product or
service.
CONDUSEF has a financial-service-supplier registry that
contains the information furnished by the competent authorities.
CONDUSEF also updates that registry. When consulting the.
registry, CONDUSEF reviews the activities related to the types of
products and/or services offered by the financial institutions in the
country. CONDUSEF examines such things as the characteristics
of similar products, the form of operation, the personnel to be
contacted in each financial institution chosen, and the commitments
assumed by the parties. CONDUSEF does not report cost or price
information related to banking products and services.
C. Procedure
The CONDUSEF procedure focuses on the user and the
particular needs of each case proposed by the user. CONDUSEF
primarily is designed to resolve contract disputes between the
consumers and the banks. CONDUSEF can also handle claims that
assets, denominated National Commission for the Protection and
Defense of Financial Services Users, whose domicile will be in the
Federal District. The protection and defense this law attributes to the
National Commission will have as a its main objective is to procure equity
in the relations between Users and Financial Institutions, giving them
elements to strengthen the juridical safety in the transactions realized and
in the relations established with the latter.
Id. at Art. 4.
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the financial institution has acted inappropriately or failed to fulfill
other obligations. Furthermore, CONDUSEF is empowered to
analyze and verify that financial institution advertising and
marketing information is truthful, effective and not misleading.
D. COND USEF Dispute Resolutions
CONDUSEF resolves disputes either through a conciliatory
procedure or through an arbitration procedure. In the former,
CONDUSEF is empowered to act as a conciliator between the
financial institutions and the users in order to protect the user's
interests. In the event that differences arise with regard to the
fulfillment of trusts, CONDUSEF will deal with the claims
submitted by the trustors or beneficiaries against the trustees.
In an arbitration procedure, an agreement of amicable
settlement is used in which the parties empower CONDUSEF to
resolve the dispute justly and equitably, guided by truth and good
faith. The subject matter of the dispute is specifically determined
by the mutual agreement of the parties.
In a settlement based on a strictly juridical lawsuit, the parties
empower CONDUSEF to resolve the submitted dispute in
accordance with the applicable law, and they determine the stages,
formalities or terms to which arbitration applies.
CONDUSEF is not a novelty or an institution designed to
provide new options for settling conflicts between the authorities
and the users of the Mexican financial system. Instead,
CONDUSEF concentrates the separate responsibilities of the
National Banking and Securities Commission, the National
Insurance and Bonding Commission and the Retirement Savings
System Commission into one system.
E. Final Considerations
The inadequate supervision of the financial system, particularly
of the credit institutions, is one of the main problems that led to the
serious banking crisis in Mexico. It also led to the ensuing federal
government bailout that resulted in enormous public debt that all
Mexican people, including future generations, will have to pay.
It should be remembered that the Mexican financial system is
made up both of institutions (like banks and auxiliary credit
organizations) and authorities such as the Ministry of Finance and
Public Credit ("SHCP"), the National Banking and Securities
Commission ("CNBV"), the Banco de M6xico ("BM"), the
National Commission for the Defense of Users of Financial
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Services ("CONDUSEF"), and the Banking Savings Protection
Institute ("IPAB"). The main duty of the National Banking and
Securities Commission is to supervise activities that are entrusted to
the credit institutions under the applicable; namely, active and
passive operations. It seems, however, that the responsible
authorities failed to fulfill their duty. In this specific case, the codes
governing the Commission and the Ministry of Finance and Public
Credit define their obligations to include such tasks as granting
authorizations, overseeing incorporation of banks and their capital
amendments and performing oversight and inspection.
The Commission is compelled to conduct scheduled visits to
the credit institutions in order to assess the risks to which the banks
are subject, to assess the control and quality of their administration,
and to maintain the appropriate liquidity, solvency and stability
under the terms of their regulatory laws. It is important to
underscore the fact that the same authorities are empowered to
issue administrative provisions in order to regulate and supervise
the banks.
Both the legal codes governing the banking institutions and the
rules regulating the acts of the authorities clearly set forth the
institutions' obligations and prohibitions precisely to avoid frauds,
mismanagement and excessive discretion in granting credits and
related guaranties (all of which had a bearing on the banking crisis).
Hence, the problem is not due to inadequate laws or loopholes but
to poor implementation and enforcement of existing laws by the
supervisory authorities.
Although it is true, as the federal government declared in due
course, that the banking rescue was necessary to avoid an undesired
crisis and economic instability, it is also true that if the authorities
entrusted with the supervision of the credit institutions had strictly
applied the law, the crisis would have been much less severe or
avoided entirely.
Finally, the replacement of FOBAPROA, whose structure was
weak, with the Banking Savings Protection Institute, which has its
own law, regulations and other administrative provisions, is not
sufficient to correct the problem. As long as the various laws
regarding the supervision of credit institutions (and, in general, all
institutions that are part of the Mexican financial system) are not
enforced, the underlying problem will not be solved even with the
creation of institutions like IPAB or CONDUSEF.
In this respect, it is necessary to reinforce the oversight powers
of the entities in charge of supervising the financial system
participants. Such oversight is necessary to ensure strict and
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complete compliance with applicable regulatory legislation and to
avoid a future crisis in the Mexican banking system. This crisis will
continue to wreak havoc upon the Mexican economy for many
years to come.

